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ABSTRACT
The object of this paper is to reply to Morrison’s ([2000]) claim that while ‘structural
unity’ was achieved at the level of the mathematical models of population genetics in the
early synthesis, there was explanatory disunity. I argue to the contrary, that the early
synthesis effected by the founders of theoretical population genetics was unifying and
explanatory both. Defending this requires a reconsideration of Morrison’s notion of
explanation. In Morrison’s view, all and only answers to ‘why’ questions which include
the ‘cause or mechanism’ for some phenomenon count as explanatory. In my view,
mathematical demonstrations that answer ‘how possibly’ and ‘why necessarily’ ques-
tions may also count as explanatory. The authors of the synthesis explained how
evolution was possible on a Mendelian system of inheritance, answered skepticism
about the sufficiency of selection, and thus explained why and how a Darwinian
research program was warranted. While today we take many of these claims as obvious,
they required argument, and part of the explanatory work of the formal sciences is
providing such arguments. Surely, Fisher and Wright had competing views as to the
optimal means of generating adaptation. Nevertheless, they had common opponents
and a common unifying and explanatory goal that their mathematical demonstrations
served.
1 Introduction: Morrison’s challenge
2 Fisher v. Wright revisited
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1 Introduction: Morrison’s challenge
Morrison ([2000]) has recently argued that unification and explanation are
often at odds in science. Using a series of examples from the history of the
physical and biological sciences, she argues that there is often a trade-off
between systematic unity at the level of mathematical theory and genuine
explanation in science. I will counter Morrison’s argument, considering one
example from the history of science that she uses as a case in point:
the disagreements between Fisher and Wright over the major mode of
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evolutionary change. While Morrison is surely correct that these two authors
of the synthesis disagreed on a number of points, I will argue that this is not a
case where unification and explanation are entirely at odds. My disagreement
with her treatment of this case hinges upon a more general disagreement over
scientific explanation.
Part of Morrison’s project is to refute Kitcher’s ([1989]) view of explana-
tion. He argues that to give an explanation is to show how the object of
explanation belongs to a class of phenomena that are derivable from a
common argument pattern. Explanations, on this view, serve to organize and
systematize the phenomena; the aim of scientific explanation is to show how
a diversity of phenomena can be brought under a single theoretical frame-
work. The various sciences advance our understanding of nature by supplying
increasingly unified accounts of data and related empirical generalizations.
Morrison argues that derivation is not explanation. For instance, while
Newton’s laws are unifying in that they enable us to derive the motions of
the planets and the trajectories of comets through space, they fail to be
explanatory (according to Morrison) in that the mechanism, gravity, is left
unexplained. As she says:
[O]ne of the most striking features of the Principia is its move away from
explanations of planetary motions in terms of mechanical causes. Instead,
the mathematical form of force is highlighted; the planetary ellipses dis-
covered by Kepler are ‘explained’ in terms of a mathematical description
of the force that produces those motions. Of course, the inverse-square
law of gravitational attraction explains why the planets move in the way
they do, but there is no explanation of how this gravitational force
acts on bodies, (how it is transported), nor is there any account of its
causal properties.
What this suggests is that explanation and unification may not be as closely
related as has typically been thought; unity is possible without a satisfactory
level of explanatory power (Morrison [2000], p. 4).
There are two ways of interpreting the above passage. Morrison could
simply be suggesting that Newton’s theory did not give a complete explana-
tion. The inverse-square law explains; but the mechanism by which the law
itself operates is not explained. But of course, a theory may explain even if
it leaves some issues open to future investigation. In this sense, no scientific
explanation is ever complete. If this is what she means, then the point would
not be contentious. It seems Morrison wishes to make a stronger point. On
her view, accounts of the phenomena that depend entirely upon mathematical
derivation are not explanatory, they do not provide ‘satisfactory’ explana-
tions. Newton formed no hypothesis about how force acts at a distance; force
at a distance is, in Einstein’s words, ‘spooky’. So, Newton’s was not a ‘sat-
isfactory’ explanation.
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True explanations, Morrison argues, ought to provide us with the how and
why at work in any particular pattern or process we attempt to explain. For
something to count as an explanation, for Morrison, it must provide ‘the
machinery, or causal behavior, of a particular system’, ‘explanatory detail’
and ‘the mechanism that explains why, but more importantly how, a certain
process takes place’ (Morrison [2000], pp. 3–5). Mathematical theories may
provide the kind of generality that makes unification possible. However,
these sorts of unifying theories, Morrison says, often sacrifice explanatory
detail—just that ‘machinery’ which makes an explanation explanatory.
It is easy to feel the pull of this claim. However satisfying a prediction from
general laws of the trajectory of a comet through space might be, we may still
have genuine cause to wonder: what is this mysterious force of gravity and
how does it work? How does force act at a distance?
However, the fact that we may further explain Newton’s laws by appeal
to the curvature of space, for instance, does not imply that the laws are not
explanatory. Whether or not an account of the operation of some factor
such as ‘gravity’ or ‘selection’ is relevant in some explanatory context depends
upon the question under investigation. Often what scientists seek is not the
details but the ‘big picture’—a theoretical framework and a reason or set
of reasons for adopting this framework. Explaining why one such framework
or research program is the one we ought to adopt is a very important part of
science. Doing so often involves appeal to mathematical argument or demon-
stration. And we may find such a demonstration or argument persuasive and
explanatory, not because it answers ‘why’ questions concerning particulars
(e.g. ‘Why did the mercury rise?’, ‘Why did the ball fall?’), but ‘how possibly’
or ‘why necessarily’ questions concerning generalities (e.g. ‘Why, for any
evolving population, is population size relevant to the distribution of gene
frequencies in future generations?’). While such explanations may leave
causal mechanisms unaccounted for, they are still explanatory, in that they
set out a general framework for understanding how any event that meets
some set of initial conditions will proceed.
Morrison’s view on what makes an explanation ‘satisfactory’ thus seems
too restrictive. It is not necessarily the case that we fail to explain when we
give a mathematical demonstration. Why questions range from the particular
to the general, and scientific questions include not only ‘why’ questions, but
also ‘how possibly?’ and ‘why necessarily?’. Scientists explain why skepticism
about some phenomenon is unwarranted, or how two theories previously
understood to be at odds are in fact consistent. These are the sorts of pro-
jects that can be achieved via formal, mathematical analysis. The sorts of
mathematical models one considers in the formal sciences are not always
concerned with describing ‘the mechanism’ or ‘the cause’ of some particular
phenomenon, so much as setting out which factors in what combinations
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can be expected to be of significance in nature, given some set of initial
conditions. Let us call these ‘theoretical explanations’. Lewontin has written,
with respect to evolutionary theory, that ‘the form of this [population genetic]
program is to produce purely analytic results of an ‘‘if, then’’ form that can be
used to demarcate the allowable from the unallowable claims of explanation,’
and, ‘‘ ‘the best to which population geneticists can aspire is a formal structure
that sets the limits of allowable explanation and a set of existentially modified
claims about what has actually happened in the real history of organisms.’
(Lewontin, 1985, pp. 199, 213)’’. In the formal sciences, the object of an
explanation is often simply setting out the conditions on the possibility of
some phenomenon coming about. In my view, Morrison has short-changed
these special explanatory virtues of the theoretical aspect of the sciences, and
of theoretical population genetics in particular. Scientific explanation is
explanation not simply of the facts, but also of prohibitions and possibilities.
Some may worry that such an account is too permissive; it seems to be an
‘anything goes’ account, according to which any ‘possible story’ could func-
tion as an explanation. Surely it’s possible that celestial harmonies caused the
planets to move in elliptical orbits, but this is not a scientific explanation.
‘Delineating the possibilities’ is, according to this objection, only to ‘have
an explanation’ (i.e., a possible story), not to ‘have an acceptable theory
that explains’ (i.e., having a story that is more than simply one among
many possibilities) (van Fraassen [1980]). This is to misunderstand my
claim, however. I am not claiming that scientific explanations are simply pos-
sible stories. To have a mathematical model that sets out the conditions for the
possibility of some event in nature is not simply to ‘have an explanation’, since
the object is not to propose any conceivable explanation for some particular
event. Rather, the object of formal analysis and demonstration in the sciences
is to delineate the conditions of adequacy of any explanatory story for some
domain. The object of such a delineation is to consider a set of factors that
have been empirically proven to operate in nature (e.g. selection, mutation,
etc.) and to show how they operate in conjunction for any system with some
set of properties (e.g. heritable variation in fitness), given some set of initial
conditions (e.g. population size, structure, etc.). This may be done without
committing to any one interpretation of the causal basis (the ‘how and
why’), for example of selection or mutation in some particular population.
Consider the following example. For any population of organisms with
heritable variation in fitness, in populations of very small size, drift, or sam-
pling error will govern changes in genetic constitution to a greater extent than
selection. In larger populations and over the long term, even a very small
difference in fitness between organisms possessing genotype x and genotype y
may yield dramatic changes in the constitution of the population. This par-
ticular generalization is reducible to the fact that when we flip a coin biased
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toward heads ten times, we are not as likely to be able to determine that it is a
biased coin as when we flip the coin a hundred times (the ‘law of large
numbers’). The generalization that the effects of drift will override the effects
of selection in small populations is not a ‘possible story’ but a necessary
conclusion of the probability theory applied to evolving populations,
described as Mendelian systems. It is explanatory in that it answers the
question, ‘Why must population size play a role in any evolving population
(so described)?’ So, by ‘delineation of the possible’, Lewontin does not mean
the logically possible, but rather the biologically possible.
2 Fisher v. Wright revisited
In the final chapter of her book, Morrison appeals to disagreements between
two theoretical population geneticists, R. A. Fisher and Sewall Wright, as a
case in point for her claim that unification and explanation are often at
odds in science. Morrison’s claim is the following. While the founders of
this discipline could agree upon the mathematics necessary to represent
evolving populations, they fundamentally disagreed on the explanation of
‘how selection acted in populations’. According to Morrison:
Structural unity achieved by the employment of mathematical methods
[. . .] was accompanied by striking disunity at the levels of both methodo-
logy and interpretation of the way in which selection and other factors
operated [. . .]. So although Fisher and Wright were interested in showing
quantitatively how natural selection could operate under certain condi-
tions, the unification was not accompanied by one consistent explanation
about how that process actually took place. (Morrison [2000], p. 212)
Wright and Fisher agreed on a quantitative way of representing evolving
populations that unified Darwinian selection and Mendelian genetics, but,
according to Morrison, they disagreed on the qualitative story of how selec-
tion operated in populations. In this case we have mathematical unity, but
explanatory disunity.
Morrison does an elegant job documenting Fisher and Wright’s methodo-
logical differences and differences in mathematical technique. However,
Fisher and Wright’s argument was not over the mechanisms leading to
selection’s successful operation. Rather, they disagreed on the balance of
factors of greatest significance in generating adaptation. On the one hand,
Fisher thought that mass selection was the main way in which adaptation
came about. Fisher argued that the factor of greatest significance in generating
adaptation was selection. On the other hand, Wright believed that a combina-
tion of isolation, drift, and intra- and inter-demic selection was both the most
effective way of generating adaptation, and a process that operated frequently
in nature. Wright argued that adaptation required a ‘balance’ of factors in
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combination; the relative significance of selection in generating adaptation
was not as much as isolation, drift and selection in combination. Morrison
calls this a disagreement about ‘the successful operation of selection’. But the
above is, in my view, better described as a relative significance controversy.
At the root of this debate, however, was not the explanation of adaptation,
but the characterization of the problem of adaptation in the first place. In
other words, Wright and Fisher were trying to answer different questions.
Their differences depended upon their views on the relative significance of
genetic interaction and population structure. Some historical context is neces-
sary to understand this point.
Wright had been a laboratory scientist before he turned to the problem of
mathematical population genetics. He used guinea pigs as a model system
to investigate the inheritance of coat color in mammals—a complex problem
that forced him to think not only about genes as simple factors, but the
physiology of genetics: how genes were expressed and interrelated. Wright’s
experience in the lab deeply influenced his conception of the problem of
adaptive evolution. Since adaptation was, in Wright’s view, a product of
gene systems, or combinations of genes that were functionally interrelated,
the problem of adaptive evolution was very specific: how is it possible for
such highly adapted systems of genes to become dissociated and to reform
into a new, more favorable combination? Wright wrote ([1932]) that ‘The
problem of evolution as I see it is that of a mechanism by which the species
may continually find its way from lower to higher peaks in such a field.’
Wright here appeals to his ([1932]) metaphor of ‘rugged adaptive land-
scapes’. A rugged adaptive landscape is a surface in a multidimensional
space that represents the mean fitness of the population as a function of
gamete (or allele) frequencies. This surface has many peaks and valleys cor-
responding to different adaptive and maladaptive population states. The
population is imagined as a point on the surface that is driven by selection
uphill but that can get stuck on a local peak. The problem of adaptation
was thus the problem of how populations of interbreeding organisms could
shift from one highly adaptive set of gene combinations to another—how
they could ‘traverse’ adaptive valleys, or move from a sub-optimal ‘adaptive
peak’ to an optimal one. Wright assumed that a population’s present state
was adaptive, in the sense that all the genes in the population were in ‘bal-
ance’. Any novel gene would force the population down into an adaptive
valley. What Wright saw as the problem for evolution was thus contingent
upon his presuppositions about gene interaction and adaptation.
Fisher did not share these presuppositions. He argued, in correspondence
with Wright (cited in Provine [1986]), that the metaphor of the adaptive land-
scape was misconceived. It was better, in Fisher’s view, to view the field of
gene combinations as a multidimensional space. Populations could increase
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their average fitness along any of several possible trajectories. According to
Fisher, the problem of adaptive evolution was simply the problem of how
to create and maintain enough variation in natural populations for selection
to act upon. As long as there was sufficient additive variance in fitness, evolu-
tion would proceed necessarily (indeed, by definition, according to the fun-
damental theorem of natural selection). In Fisher’s view, the constraints on
evolving populations were not so restrictive that selection alone could not be
responsible for a population evolving from a sub-optimal to a more adaptive
state.1 Fisher was aware that genes had interactive effects (see his [1918] and
[1922]), but his view was that these did not prevent populations from becom-
ing more fit. In fact, the interactive effects of genes could overpower deleteri-
ous mutations via ‘Modifier’ genes. Fisher did not offer a qualitative theory
of evolution akin to Wright’s shifting balance theory, because Fisher did not
share Wright’s conception of the problem of adaptive evolution. So no such
theory was, in his view, necessary. Simple mass selection was, he thought,
sufficient for adaptive evolution.
The object of explanation was different for Fisher and for Wright, then, in
two senses. First, the preconceptions they had about the genetic structure of
populations of organisms in nature were fundamentally different. Second, in
part as a result of this, the problems of evolution, those that they believed
most required solving, were different. Morrison concludes that their disagree-
ments were over how to explain the ‘successful operation’ of selection. While I
concede to Morrison that Wright and Fisher disagreed, I would suggest that
it is better to view their differences as resting upon their different conceptions
of the problem of adaptive evolution. It was not the ‘successful operation of
selection’ they disagreed upon so much as the relative significance of selection
versus drift, given their different background assumptions about genetic
interaction and population structure. For Wright, the most pressing question
for evolutionary biology was, ‘By what mechanism may a species continually
find its way from lower to higher peaks in the adaptive landscape?’ For
Fisher, the most pressing question for evolution was, ‘How is there sufficient
variation for selection to act upon?’
This point to one side, let us examine the more general moral which
Morrison attempts to draw from this case. Morrison claims that explanation
and unification were at odds in the case of the early synthesis. While
Morrison is correct that Wright and Fisher disagreed on the factors of
greatest significance in generating adaptation, I suggest that this observa-
tion by itself does not support her more general conclusion. Morrison’s
1 Interestingly, subsequent work by theoretical population geneticists has supported Fisher’s
views. Gavrilets ([1999]) argues, for example, that Wright’s metaphor should be replaced
with a ‘holey’ landscape.
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characterization of the explanatory work of the authors of the synthesis
presupposes that all and only explanations which give the complete causal
story of how evolution proceeds are satisfactory. Morrison writes:
It was possible, using two different quantitative methods, to produce a
unification of genetics with Darwinian theory by showing that selection,
even in cases in which only small pressures were exerted, operated in
Mendelian populations. Yet, despite agreement on that basic unifying
principle, there was significant disagreement at the explanatory level reg-
arding how the evolutionary process actually took place. ([2000], p. 227)
And again,
Theoretical agreement on unification of genetics with evolutionary theory
could not have been achieved if the theorists had been required to supply
the explanatory details about how and why selection operated in
particular types of populations. ([Ibid.], p. 229)
Morrison begs the question against the unificationist in the above passages.
A great deal hangs upon her characterization of the ‘explanatory level’. If what
counts as the ‘explanatory level’ is only explanations of how the evolutionary
process actually takes place, then Morrison has won her point. However, in my
view, science aims to explain not only what is actual, but also what is possible
and necessary. For instance, agreement on a synthesis of Darwinism and
Mendelism was an explanatory feat; it required a mathematical demonstration
of how and why the two might be viewed as compatible. It seems too parsi-
monious to claim that such a demonstration is not explanatory. Explaining
‘how and why selection operated in particular types of populations’ is certainly
part of the work of evolutionary theory. However, it is not all that evolution-
ary theory explains. Below, I elaborate upon the ways in which theory may
serve as explanatory which do not concern the particular or the merely actual.
3 The early synthesis
Morrison’s thesis is that unification and explanation are often at odds in
science. In Morrison’s view, an explanation is satisfactory when it identifies
the causal mechanism at work in generating some event or state of affairs in
the world. Morrison seems to be supporting the view, originally due to
Salmon, that an explanation provides a causal story, or ‘to give scientific
explanations is to show how events [. . .] fit into the causal structure of the
world.’ However, I think a case can be made that the architects of the early
synthesis did indeed provide explanations, but these explanations were of a
different sort than the ‘causal story’ explanations favored by Salmon. Rather,
they were explanations of a ‘how possibly’ and ‘how necessarily’ sort, discuss-
ed above. I will turn Morrison’s example on its head, and argue that, in fact,
theoretical population genetics was both unifying and explanatory.
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Despite the many subtle and intriguing differences and disagreements
among its founders about which questions are of greatest significance
and about the optimal means of generating adaptation, theoretical popula-
tion geneticists in the 1920s and 30s did provide a unified explanation of how
Darwinian evolution is possible on a Mendelian system of inheritance. In
addition, Fisher, Haldane and Wright demonstrated, using relatively simple
mathematical models, that:
1. A very weak selective advantage is sufficient to fix an allele in relatively
few generations on an evolutionary time-scale. This sufficiency of selection
argument effectively ruled out competing explanations of evolution
(mutationist, neo-Lamarckian), as I will explain below.
2. The rates of mutation would not be sufficient to outdistance the force of
selection acting in a population. This ruled out ‘orthogenesis’—or the idea
of mutational pressure driving evolution.
3. In very small populations, selection will be counterbalanced by the
random fixation of alleles, or ‘genetic drift’. In other words, the effective-
ness of selection versus drift is relative to effective population size.
4. An unfavorable, even lethal, recessive mutation will stabilize itself at low
frequency, but not disappear from a population. This result is often cited
to explain why eugenics would be a slow and inefficient process if directed
at homozygotes alone.
Such proofs of possibility are not insignificant in the history of science.
They set out the boundary conditions on the range of possible processes
that can generate change in a system; setting out the conditions in this way
is explanatory in that it yields a quantitative understanding of the ‘prohibi-
tions and possibilities’ for evolution in any population. The sort of under-
standing yielded by these mathematical demonstrations is akin to that
described by Salmon as ‘Weltanschauung’-style understanding, as opposed
to ‘black box’ causal stories. At the time that Fisher and Wright developed
these models, there was no systematic account of how the different factors of
selection, mutation, migration, drift and assortative mating could generate
changes in a population. This work not only provided a unified mathematical
way of picturing evolutionary change, but also demonstrated how it was
possible for selection to generate the vast diversity that seemed so implausibly
created by minor selective advantages offered by .4 centimeter of beak length
or carapace width.
First, a caveat: I wish to be clear here about this claim of the sufficiency of
selection. I am not claiming that Fisher, Haldane and Wright demonstrated
that selection is the only factor in evolution. Rather, they showed that it
was possible for selection acting on small, continuous variation to have a
significant effect in a relatively short time. By way of making this intuitive,
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imagine the following figure: let the y-axis represent generations, and the
x-axis represent proportion of individuals in a population possessing some
allele, with a selection coefficient of only .01. Or, the relative advantage in
terms of passing on offspring of some individual possessing such an allele is
only 1%. The curve that describes the replacement of other alleles by this
allele is a logistic curve; the gene will spread very slowly at first, but eventu-
ally ‘take off’ and ‘fix’ in the population. This is because the effect is multi-
plicative, rather than additive.
This is the first aspect of what I meant by the ‘sufficiency of selection’
above: that it is simply possible for small selection coefficients to have a
large effect. The second aspect involves an implicit appeal to parsimony:
the claim that selection is sufficient to undermine the necessity of appealing
to competing mechanisms of evolution. Inheritance of acquired characters,
mutationism, orthogenesis and other hypothetical mechanisms of evolution
were no longer necessary for the evolutionary process. The mathematical
models of theoretical population genetics were capable of generating the
plausibility arguments necessary to give biologists good reason to pursue a
Darwinian research program. Such prudential arguments are an important
part of the explanatory work of science. Note, however, that such arguments
do not appeal to ‘causal details’ of how much selection operated in the
determination of this or that trait. This would simply not be relevant.
Population genetics defined which factors are key for evolution, which
factors may be ruled out, and how the various parameters of evolution within
a population are interrelated. It defined the realm of what is possible, and
distinguished it from what is implausible. Moreover, it gave evolutionists
a systematic way of representing evolutionary change in populations on a
Mendelian system of inheritance, and defined how the different parameters,
or mechanisms in evolution, constrained one another. This was explanatory
in the following way. It provided a general framework for thinking about
evolution, which pulled together what were understood to be competing
research traditions under a single common framework, demonstrating that
they are not only compatible, but complementary. In sum, population gen-
etics served to define and delineate which processes are sufficient for evolu-
tion, effectively reducing the number we need to take as brute: selection,
mutation, assortative mating, migration and drift. Prior to the 1920s and
30s, it was an open question how evolution proceeds, and whether it was
necessary to invoke Lamarckian or mutationist mechanisms to supplement
selection. Attention to the historical context immediately preceding the devel-
opment of theoretical population genetics demonstrates how this work served
as explanatory.
In 1907, Vernon Kellogg published a state of the union address on
the issues yet to be solved in evolutionary biology, entitled Evolution and
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Animal Life. He quoted Henry Fairfield Osborn as saying ‘the original
Darwinian factor, or Neo-Darwinism, offers an inadequate explanation
of evolution’ (Kellogg [1908], p. 374). And he added this comment:
Our present plight seems to be exactly this: we cannot explain to any
general satisfaction species forming and evolution without the help of
some Lamarckian or Eimerian factor; and on the other hand, we cannot
assume the actuality of any such factor in the light of our present
knowledge of heredity. ([Ibid.], p. 374)
These views represented the majority view before Fisher, Haldane and Wright
developed their mathematical models. Many biologists were sympathetic to
Darwinism, but found it inadequate, in that it was difficult to understand
how selection alone could generate such diversity. Fisher, Haldane and
Wright were able to give proofs of this possibility.
Explaining what is possible, and, moreover, ruling out what is implausible,
is part of the dialectic of the advancement of science, and is what the import-
ant explanatory work of mathematical theories such as theoretical popula-
tion genetics consists in.
4 Conclusion: unification and explanation reconciled
Now I will return to the more general philosophical concern that motivated
this paper: the relation between explanation and unification. Morrison’s claim
was that ‘explanation and unification are often at odds in science,’ and used
the disagreements between Fisher and Wright as a case in point. My argument
has been that Fisher and Wright’s disagreements do not support her point,
but rather provide an example of the contrary. Using mathematical models,
Haldane, Wright and Fisher described the conditions for, and constraints on,
a general theory of evolution. They provided general theoretical demonstra-
tions of, for instance, the effectiveness of selection and the constraints
provided by population size that make no reference to the causal machinery
at work in any particular evolving lineage (e.g. ecological conditions, etc.).
In Kitcher’s words, ‘explanations need not, and sometimes should not,
deliver information about the causal history of a particular occurrence.’
And science may advance our understanding of nature by ‘providing informa-
tion about constraints on causal processes’ ([1989], p. 427 and p. 417, my
emphasis).
Morrison’s view seems to be that the causal view trumps Kitcher’s unifica-
tionist model; correct or complete explanations, in her view, must appeal
to causes. However, I don’t see the ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ approaches
to explanation as, prima facie, at odds. I take my cue from Salmon ([1984]),
who has suggested that there be ‘rapprochement’ between two competing
views.
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Salmon distinguishes two types of explanation, explanation1 and
explanation2, which he roughly aligns with Kitcher’s earlier distinction
between what he called ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ explanations. The first
sort of explanation is when we give a causal story, for instance, in terms of
forces acting on some part of a physical system. His example is the case of
the friendly physicist in an airplane. He asks the boy sitting across the aisle
holding a helium-filled balloon what he thought the balloon might do when
the airplane accelerated rapidly for takeoff. After some consideration, the
boy suggested that the balloon would move toward the back of the cabin.
To the contrary, the physicist wagered that it would move to the front. He
was correct, and won a complimentary bottle of scotch from a bewildered
flight attendant. Salmon ([1990], p. 11) describes two explanations of the
phenomena: first, as the plane accelerates, the rear wall of the cabin exerts
a force on the air molecules near the back, which produces a pressure gradient
from rear to front. Given that the inertia of the balloon is smaller than that of
the air it displaces, the balloon tends to move in the direction of less dense air.
This is a causal explanation in terms of the forces exerted on the parts of the
physical system. Second, one can appeal to Einstein’s principle of equival-
ence, which says that an acceleration is physically equivalent to a gravita-
tional field. The effect of acceleration of the airplane is the same as that of
a gravitational field. Since a helium balloon in air will rise in the earth’s
gravitational field, so too it will tend to move forward in the air of the
cabin in the presence of the aircraft’s acceleration. This second explanation
is an example of a unificationist or ‘top–down’-type explanation, in that it
shows how this one case falls under a single argument pattern, or how it fits
within a certain theoretical framework.
I wish to argue the following: scientific explanation is not exclusively a
‘top–down’ or ‘bottom–up’ affair. I think that the two are complementary;
exclusive emphasis on one or the other is misguided. Often, what we are
willing to take as acceptable causal stories is contingent upon our best avail-
able theory. For instance, in the case of the balloon example above, we no
longer appeal to Newton’s theory of gravitation, but to Einstein’s principle of
equivalence. Likewise, in the case of evolutionary biology, biologists today do
not appeal to Lamarckian use and disuse or mutational pressure. These sorts
of causal mechanisms were rendered unnecessary by the sorts of theoretical
arguments offered by population geneticists in the 1920s and 30s.
In other words, scientific explanations may not only tell us why or how
some fact in the world is so, they may also rule out unnecessary factors or
mechanisms, and define how those mechanisms function and constrain one
another. This is exactly what theoretical population genetics does. As a result
of these demonstrations, population genetics explained how and why many
of the then-live alternatives to Darwinian evolution were no longer viable.
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Neo-Lamarckism, orthogenesis, mutationism and ultra-Darwinism all held
that there were ultimate forces of evolution that somehow directed evolution:
either internal, in the case of the mutationists, or external, in the case of the
Lamarckians. Population geneticists were able to explain how some funda-
mental force need not direct evolution, either from within or outside of the
organism. There was no ‘ultimate factor’ to evolution.
Now, I need to say a bit here about the view I am not defending: I am not
defending the ‘unification writ large’ view, according to which all the sciences
are, or will be, reducible to physics. I am not defending a reduction or
elimination of causation, though with Kitcher I think that answering
Hume’s worries is an extremely difficult project, which has not yet been suf-
ficiently addressed.2 Rather, I am suggesting that in the case of theoretical
population genetics at least, unification and explanation are not at odds;
and indeed, here is a case which brings into question Morrison’s thesis.
Morrison makes assumptions about explanation: that explanations are
always answers to ‘why’ questions, and that the task of explanation is to
supply a causal mechanism. I take it that I have demonstrated how both of
these assumptions are questionable. Explanations may also be answers to
‘how possibly’ questions—where what is proffered in reply is not the ‘supply
of a causal mechanism’, but rather an account of constraints on any causal
process.
The sort of explanation that I have attempted to bring attention to here is
the sort that directs us toward a unified research program. This may involve
appeal to a family of models and model arguments. One important compon-
ent of the factors that made the evolutionary synthesis possible was the
application of statistical methods and mathematical models to the problems
of variation, heredity and evolution via natural selection. Fisher, Haldane
and Wright developed a heuristic that contributed to the way evolution
was conceived; namely, as a genetic process. Their major mode of explanation
was theoretical models. They used these mathematical models to show
how and why, among other questions, the sex ratio comes to be 1:1, and
how effective population size affects rate of loss of genetic variation. These
models served both to unify the Darwinian perspective with Mendelian
genetics and to structure the field of permissible answers to evolutionary
questions.
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